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THE PUBLIC DOMAIN REVISITED
Edward Samuels*
I. THE EMERGENCE OF A THEORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
A. The Public Domain, Circa 1993
In a 1993 article published in the Journal of the Copyright
Society, I posed the following questions:
Is the public domain simply whatever is left over after vari-
ous tests of legal protection have been applied? Is it the
mere "background," the "negative" of whatever may be
protected? Or is there something about the public domain,
some compelling public policy or legal principle, that gives
it a life of its own, that would tend to attribute positive as-
pects to it, that would make it something of the form instead
of just the background?'
I answered the questions as follows:
After reviewing the various proposed arguments support-
ing a general theory of the public domain.., it would ap-
pear that there simply is no such general theory. Instead,
there are several discrete contexts in which arguments about
the public domain are encountered, each context raising dif-
ferent considerations that may have little or nothing to do
with each other, and that cumulatively constitute what re-
mains after one examines all possible sources of legal
protection for works of authorship. What is gained by
reifying the negative, and imagining a "theory" of the
public domain? If one wants to encourage a presumption
against new forms or areas of protection, then one can do so
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Professor Samuels's copy-
right website is at www.nyls.edu/samuels/copyright.
1. Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYR.
SOC'Y 137, 137 [hereinafter Samuels, The Public Domain].
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without having to invoke a magical "public domain." There
are dozens of battlegrounds between those who want to ex-
pand intellectual property protection and those who want to
limit it or narrow it in any given context. The arguments in
each context should be kept separate, since they raise dif-
ferent policy issues.
Nevertheless, the individual issues sometimes tend to be
elusive, and one's attitude toward them tends to be flavored
as often as not by one's general attitude toward copyright
law. If those who find themselves continually on the side
arguing for a limitation of protection need a rallying cry,
perhaps it can be "the public domain." The invocation may
seem to add a moral overtone to the argument, to counter-
balance the morally charged principles invoked time and
again by the protectionists. In the final analysis, however,
[paraphrasing Ralph Brown] "such vague rhetoric does lit-
tle more than adorn the stage on which actual choices must
be played out."
2
Professor James Boyle has responded to the questions I asked in
my earlier article, as follows:
What is gained by reifying the negative? Professor
Samuels' question is a good one. He supplies part of the
answer with his thought that perhaps the language of the
public domain will be used to counter the language of sa-
cred property. This is indeed an important point; language
matters, and not just as "rhetoric."
Of equal importance is the power of a concept like the
environment both to clarify and to reshape perceptions of
self interest.
3
Professor Boyle goes on to compare the development of the "public
domain" movement to the development of the environmental law
movement.
4
2. Id. at 150.
3. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, in CONFERENCE ON THE PUBLIC DoMAIN, Nov. 9-11, 2001,
DUKE LAW SCHOOL, at 39-41, at http://www.law.duke.edu/
pd/papers/boyle.pdf.
4. See id. at 42-43.
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Notwithstanding the power of the word, or the phrase, that Pro-
fessor Boyle describes, I believe that what I said in 1993 is essen-
tially still correct. The major difference is that the literature invok-
ing, creating, celebrating, or applying the public domain ideology has
expanded tremendously in the intervening years. Not since eco-
nomic theory invaded copyright (and just about every other area of
law) have we seen such a joining of voices to create a new body of
scholarship, building one article and book upon another-without
having much actual influence, however, upon the development of the
law as created by legislators and judges. That last point may be
about to change. In their attack upon the Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998, 5 the petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcrof!6 hope to bring the
public domain rhetoric and theory to the fore, and make it, from now
on, a dominant force in Congress's deliberations and judges' reviews
of copyright generally.
In my article, I identified six different categories of the public
domain.7 In each category, the trend over the past 200 years has
been an expansion of copyright, and a concomitant diminution of
what might be considered the public domain. In the first category,
the duration of copyright has been extended from a maximum of
twenty-eight years to, under the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998, life of the author plus seventy years. 8 The second category,
public domain through forfeiture of copyright, has been all but
eliminated by the abandonment of copyright formalities under the
Berne Implementation Act of 1988.9 The third category, works cate-
gorically excluded from copyright, has also been diminishing over
the years as the scope of copyright has expanded to cover a widening
category of works. I argued that the other three categories, although
aligned by some writers with public domain theory, should particu-
larly be decided on other grounds: public domain aspects of other-
wise copyrightable works, public domain as a substitute for preemp-
tion analysis, and public domain as a substitute for measuring the
5. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c),
302, 303, 304 (2000)).
6. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002).
7. See Samuels, The Public Domain, supra note 1, at 151-77.
8. See § 102, 112 Stat. at 2827.
9. See Beme Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
568, 102 Stat. 2853 (amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1988)).
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retroactivity of copyright enactments. 10 In all six areas, the public
domain advocates were making arguments against the tide; they la-
mented the expansions of copyright, but could hardly claim that the
public domain analysis had in fact already worked its way into
dominant copyright theory.
B. The Technological Battleground-Everybody's Losing!
In the intervening years, the public domain agenda seems to
have been spurred primarily by technological concerns. What is fas-
cinating to me is that, in the technological realm, everybody thinks
that they have lost the copyright battle. The copyright owners look
on as others digitize and disseminate their works on the Internet. In
the words of Apple's advertisements for its new iMac, the mantra is
"Rip. Mix. Bum."'1 This sounds awfully like "Copy. Make a de-
rivative work. Distribute." which are supposed to be the exclusive
rights of copyright under section 106.12 The copyright owners are
horrified at the "hemorrhaging" of their control over their works.
Some of the early technological pronouncements had a decid-
edly flippant tone, as if no one but the digerati could possibly under-
stand what was going on. As declared in Wired Magazine in March
1994, and repeated by such advocates as Mitch Kapor and John Perry
Barlow in presentations across the country:
Notions of property, value, ownership, and the nature of
wealth itself are changing more fundamentally than at any
time since the Sumerians first poked cuneiform into wet
clay and called it stored grain. Only a very few people are
aware of the enormity of this shift, and fewer of them are
lawyers or public officials. 13
This was the same time as Internet gurus were proclaiming that the
Internet world was not subject to other basic concepts, like principles
of investment, accounting or gravity.
10. See Samuels, The Public Domain, supra note 1, at 164-77.
11. See Apple website, at www.apple.com./uk/hardware/ads/
ripmixbum.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2002).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
13. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethink-
ing Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know About
Intellectual Property is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 85, 86.
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However, the established interests did in fact "get it." Various
copyright industries were successful in convincing Congress to pass
copyright laws directed at the new digitization of copyrighted works.
The Record Rental Amendment of 1984 created an exception to the
first sale doctrine in the case of rented audio works, largely because
the emergence of DVDs made the copying of rented music much
more of a threat to the existing markets for distribution of music.
14
The Computer Rental Software Amendment of 1990 created a simi-
lar exception for the rental of computer software.' 5 Congress passed
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 to handle the modem con-
sequences of home recording using the new digital recording de-
vices.16 Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 to handle the distribution of music over the
Internet and other digital distribution systems.' 7 And then, in 1998,
Congress adopted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to allow
copyright owners to better enforce their rights through technological
protection measures and copyright management information sys-
tems. 1
8
The landscape has so changed that the public domain advocates
are beginning to announce that they, not the copyright industries, are
losing the copyright battle. The primary spokesperson, Lawrence
Lessig, in his most recent manifesto, portrays a grim future-actually
present-in which the digital technologies are not a liberating force
for the masses, but rather a tool of the copyright industries in abso-
lutely controlling access to cultural works. 19  It all comes as
14. See Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat.
1727 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 115(c) (1984)).
15. See Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5134 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) and add-
ing § 109(e) (1991)).
16. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106
Stat. 4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C., ch. 10 (1992)).
17. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. (1996)).
18. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104 and adding 17
U.S.C., ch. 12 (1998)).
19. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 180-217 (2001). I have just finished
reading the science fiction works, Hyperion and The Fall of Hyperion, by Dan
Simmons. Those works are somewhat more apocalyptic in their portrayal of
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something of a surprise to the copyright industries that they have
won the war.
Given the recent technological battleground, it is interesting, and
perhaps surprising, that the major case to present the public domain
agenda before the Supreme Court should have nothing to do with
technology. Instead, it ostensibly focuses upon just about the oldest
question that has been at the heart of the copyright debate from the
beginning-how long should the term of copyright be? As this Arti-
cle will discuss later, there is probably a tendency to try to view the
public domain agenda broadly, and decide even the age-old questions
in light of the new issues raised by technology. As this Article sug-
gests, it is better for everyone if we focus upon the issues one at a
time, and if we do not allow the broader agenda to cloud decisions
that must be made in the discrete contexts.
C. The Relationship Between Public Domain Analysis and Other
Bases of Copyright
In my 1993 article, I briefly explored the relationship between
the discussions of the public domain and basic theories about the role
and basis for copyright, as follows:
The writings about the importance of the public domain
seem to some extent to parallel other arguments that have
been around since copyright was first recognized in English
and American law; namely, arguments about the theoretical
source or justification for copyright generally. Many pro-
tectionists have tried to justify copyright law as based upon
(1) natural rights (2) moral rights or (3) property rights.
Critics have tried to limit this approach by (1) gleefully cit-
ing the embarrassing early history of copyright law in Eng-
land... ; (2) emphasizing the "social utility" theory of
copyright, by which the only or main justification for allow-
ing what is basically a "monopoly" is the ultimate good that
is achieved for society by an increase in the number, maybe
even the quality, of works destined for the public domain;
and (3) in recent years, subjecting copyright protection to a
the battle among the forces of the "Hegemony," the "Technocore," and the
mysterious "Ousters." See DAN SIMMONS, TiHE FALL OF HYPERION (reissue
1995); DAN SIMMONS, HYPERION (1989). But Lessig's book certainly taps
into a popular fear/fantasy of the tech-savvy citizens of the Internet.
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strict economic analysis that would limit any benefit to the
copyright owner that was not clearly justified by a
concomitant increase in the public good (read "public do-
main"). These arguments might be bolstered by (4) an ex-
plicit or implicit reference to principles, even constitutional
standards, from outside the copyright clause, particularly
the first amendment's guarantee of free speech.2 °
The arguments about the public domain and the theoretical un-
derpinnings of copyright have taken on almost a religious fervor in
recent years. Otherwise reasonable people arguing different sides of
the issue tend to become as emotionally overwrought as any abortion
rights (or anti-abortion rights) advocate. In several recent confer-
ences and private discussions about copyright theory, about all one
has to do is mention the words "natural rights" or "property rights,"
and public domain advocates are practically jumping from their seats
to "set the record straight." They argue passionately that property
rights talk is a development of the latter part of the twentieth century,
and that copyright was not brought under the rubric of "intellectual
property" until the last fifty years when the giant corporations some-
how manipulated the world into thinking that their exclusive rights of
patent, copyright, trademark and other rights were entitled to be pro-
tected as "property."
2'
But the natural rights and property rights rhetoric is firmly
rooted in copyright history. It is recognized as the basis for copy-
right protection in civil law and other countries outside of England
and the United States.22 Although it is commonly argued that the
English and United States origins were based upon non-property,
20. Samuels, The Public Domain, supra note 1, at 177-80.
21. Black's Law Dictionary defines property as "that which belongs exclu-
sively to one"; copyright is defined as a set of "exclusive rights" in 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106 and 106A. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (abr. 6th ed. 1991); Ex-
clusive Rights in Copyrighted Works, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-106A (2000). When it
serves their interests, petitioners in the Eldred case are not averse to using a
property law analogy: "Copyright law had, in effect, vested in these petition-
ers, as well as in the public, a remainderman interest in the works at stake."
Brief for Petitioners at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Petition-
ers Brief]. Of course, a remainderman is only "[o]ne who is entitled to the re-
mainder of the estate after a particular estate carved out of it has expired."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
22. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 165-96 (2d ed. 1995).
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non-natural rights principles, the preambles to several of the state
copyright statutes under the Articles of Confederation incorporated
property and natural rights rhetoric with the "social utility" theory.
For example, the Connecticut statute of 1783, which served as the
model for the Georgia and New York statutes, began:
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of natu-
ral equity and justice, that every author should be secured in
receiving the profits that may arise from the sale of his
works, and such security may encourage men of learning
and genius to publish their writings; which may do honor to
their country, and service to mankind.23
The Massachusetts statute of 1783, which served as a model for
the New Hampshire and Rhode Island statutes, provided:
Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of
civilization, the public weal of the community, and the ad-
vancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the ef-
forts of learned and ingenious persons in the various arts
and sciences: As the principal encouragement such persons
can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this na-
ture, must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their
study and industry to themselves; and as such security is
one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property
more peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced
by the labour of his mind.24
The North Carolina statute of 1785 provided:
Whereas nothing is more strictly a man's own than the
fruit of his study, and it is proper that men should be en-
couraged to pursue useful knowledge by the hope of re-
ward; and as the security of literary property must greatly
tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries,
and to the general extension of arts and commerce .... 25
In addition, many scholars and observers over the years have
found natural and property rights bases in United States copyright
23. THORVALD SOLBERG, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING
TO COPYRIGHT I (rev. bulletin no. 3, 1973) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS].
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id. at 15.
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legislation. For example, the Report of the Register of Copyrights, in
the early stages of copyright revision, identified strands of property
right and personal right, as well as monopoly limitation theories.
26
Many of the expansions and other developments of copyright
simply cannot be explained by a strict public domain theory of copy-
right. As concluded by Paul Goldstein, "[t]he 1976 Copyright Act's
special treatment of involuntary transfers of copyright, for example,
and its provisions for termination of transfers can be better explained
in terms of natural rights theory than in terms of a utilitarian balance
of social benefit. 27 Contrary to the suggestions of some public do-
main advocates, Goldstein observes: "As a general rule, copyright
law in the United States entitles copyright owners to capture the full
value that consumers attach to their works and not just the minimum
sum that they would require to support their investment."
28
Here is my conclusion as expressed in the 1993 article:
American copyright law has suffered for two hundred
years from the absence of a clearly articulated theoretical
basis. Some might see this as some sort of oversight or
conspiracy. I don't think so. I think that Congress and the
courts have thereby maintained flexibility in the develop-
ment of the law.
... [T]he different theories represent different ways of
looking at copyright law that can be used to explain differ-
ent aspects of it, but none of which is adequate to explain
the whole, and none of which trumps the others.
29
I even suggested that, based upon the clear expansions of copyright
over the years, and the "convergence" of copyright principles
through the adoption of international standards, "[i]t should therefore
26. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3-6 (1961); see also Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equity and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). While
Professor Gordon analyzes copyright under a Lockean property model, she
finds in that model not only principles of protection but also principles of limi-
tation. See id. at 1549-51.
27. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 9
(1989).
28. Id. at 7.
29. Samuels, The Public Domain, supra note 1, at 180-81.
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now be possible to ascribe to American copyright law the broad
theoretical basis that until recent years may have been premature. ' 3
0
In any event, because there is no consensus that any one copy-
right principle trumps any other, and because the whole of copyright
is ultimately based upon a balancing of interests, the principles sim-
ply do not help in resolving discrete copyright issues. If it were
within my power, I would call a truce. I would not invoke natural
rights and property rights justifications for copyright if public do-
main advocates would concede that there is no public domain theory
that trumps other rights. We could then proceed to deal with the
copyright issues as they arise.
D. "Retroactivity"
In my earlier article, I argued that the public domain rhetoric
was sometimes used, inappropriately, as a substitute for measuring
the retroactivity of a copyright statute. After analyzing the issue, I
concluded as follows:
[I]t simply is not clear whether Congress is prohibited from
reviving works that previously entered the public domain,
and there are at least some convincing suggestions that it
has power to revive works not previously protected. In any
event, issues of retroactivity should not be determined by an
ill-defined concept of the "public domain," but can be ana-
lyzed by reference to a richer literature dealing with retro-
activity of legislation.
3 1
Part of that "richer literature" suggests that: "Even for statutes that
affect criminal behavior or contract rights, most securely protected
against retroactive legislation by the due process, ex post facto, and
impairment of contracts clauses of the Constitution, it is hard to
make absolute statements."
32
As stated by one expert in statutory construction:
It is misleading to use the terms "retrospective" and "ret-
roactive," as has sometimes been done, to mean that the act
is unconstitutional. The question of validity rests on further
subtle judgments concerning the fairness of applying the
30. Id. at 181-82.
31. Id. at 175.
32. Id. at 175-76.
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new statute. Even where a constitution explicitly and un-
qualifiedly prohibits the enactment of retrospective statutes,
the courts usually strike down only those statutes whose ret-
roactivity results in measurable unfairness.
33
Since I made my observations, Congress has indeed found a
context in which it has restored copyrights in certain works. Con-
gress passed a new section 104A, which provided for the restoration
of foreign copyrights that had gone into the public domain, primarily
through noncompliance with U.S. copyright formalities. That
amendment was passed pursuant to international obligations-first,
in 1993, in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 35 and then, in
1994, broadened as a result of the World Trade Organization agree-
ment.36 Public domain advocates have brought a court challenge to
that Act in the case of Golan v. Ashcroft.37
Section 104A was designed partly to be fair to foreign authors
whose works went into the public domain in this country through a
failure to comply with formalities that no other country required. 38 It
was also motivated by a desire to allow U.S. copyright owners to get
their works "restored" in other countries that for one reason or an-
other had not granted copyright protection.
39
It is not my purpose to defend the Golan case or section 104A
here. The Eldred case, that is the subject of the rest of this Article,
does not actually involve the retroactive application of copyright law,
since the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 that is challenged in
33. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 41.05, at 368 (5th
ed. 1992).
34. While the primary import of section 104A is to cover works that went
into the public domain due to "noncompliance with formalities imposed at any
time by United States copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of
proper notice, or failure to comply with any manufacturing requirements," the
act also applies to foreign sound recordings published before the effective date
of U.S. protection. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6) (2000).
35. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
36. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Ne-
gotiations, Dec. 30, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
37. No. 01-B-1854 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
39. For example, some countries did not grant rights in sound recordings or
computer programs until relatively late in the twentieth century, and sound re-
cordings and computer programs represented substantial U.S. exports.
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that case does not apply to any works that have already fallen into
the public domain. And, as I urge here, we should not be arguing the
Eldred case by jockeying for position in other contexts. But I do be-
lieve that my cautious approach, not necessarily setting off the con-
stitutional alarm every time a magic word, like retroactive, 40 is used,
is as important today as it was when I made the suggestion a decade
ago. Let us save the arguments about Golan for another day.
II. ELDRED V. RENO/ASHCROFT
A. The Undesirable Extremes
1. The D.C. Circuit opinion
In 1998, Congress passed the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA).4' That Act extended the term of protection for all works
created after January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the Copyright Act
of 1976) by twenty years, from life of the author plus fifty years to
life of the author plus seventy years.42 It extended the term of works
created prior to 1978 from seventy-five years from publication to
ninety-five years from publication.43 Eric Eldred and various other
plaintiffs, represented by Lawrence Lessig, brought a constitutional
challenge to the CTEA, suing Janet Reno, as Attorney General, in the
District Court of the District of Columbia.44 That court upheld the
constitutionality of the CTEA.45 In 2001, the District of Columbia
40. Retroactive is probably the wrong word to use here. Even section 104A
does not apply to activities that took place before it was passed. It restores
copyrights, but only applies to activities that take place after its enactment. In-
deed, it contains an elaborate mechanism for protecting "reliance parties" who
may have invested in what they thought were public domain works. These
mechanisms involve notice of intent to restore copyright, and even a compul-
sory license at a reasonable compensation for creators of derivative works
based upon works that were, at the time, in the public domain. See 17 U.S.C. §
104A(d)(3).
41. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c),
302, 303, 304 (2000)).
42. See id. § 102(b), 112 Stat. at 2827 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)).
43. See id. § 102(d), 112 Stat. at 2827-28 (amending 17 U.S.C. §
304(a)(1)).
44. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).
45. See id. at 3.
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN RE VISITED
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, with a dissent by
Judge Sentelle.46 The Circuit Court denied a petition for rehearing
and for rehearing en banc. 47 The Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari in February 2002.48
The approach of the D.C. Circuit Court was to cut off discussion
of the constitutional issues by the adoption of what appeared to be an
absolute rule that copyright laws were immune from constitutional
attack.49 The court concluded that the preamble to the Constitution's
Copyright Clause (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts" by securing exclusive rights
"for limited Times" 50) "is not a substantive limit on Congress' legis-
lative power." 51 The court went on to conclude that "copyrights are
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment"
because of the idea/expression dichotomy, the fair use doctrine, and
other limiting principles that already factor in the constitutional con-
siderations.
52
The concern of public domain scholars is not only with copy-
right term extension, but also with other recent expansions of copy-
right. For example, as discussed above, the public domain advocates
have brought a lawsuit challenging the restoration of copyright under
section 104A of the Copyright Act. 53 But the 800-pound gorilla
looming on the horizon is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 (the DMCA).5 4 That Act provides for the legal protection of
technological protection systems and copyright management infor-
mation systems. 55 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,56 the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and then, under
46. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
47. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), reh 'g denied, 255
F.3d 849 (2001).
48. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01-618).
49. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378.
52. Id. at 375-76.
53. See Golan v. Ashcroft, No. 01-B-1854 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001).
54. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended at §§ 101, 104 and adding 17 U.S.C., ch. 12
(1998)).
55. See id.
56. 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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the name Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 57 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the statute against constitutional chal-
lenge. 58 Despite the ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
some scholars still maintain that the statute is constitutionally defec-
tive because, as the courts have interpreted it, the Act does not apply
the idea/expression dichotomy, the fair use doctrine, or other limita-
tions of copyright to the DMCA protections. Constitutional issues
might also be relevant to other acts that Congress may consider, such
as in the area of database protection.
The public domain scholars are thus particularly alarmed at the
categorical exclusion test adopted by the D.C. Circuit Court in El-
dred 59 Quite frankly, the pro-copyright industries should also have
been alarmed, since the broadness of the ruling may have been what
piqued the interest of the Supreme Court in granting certiorari. The
petitioners were able to frame the issue as whether the D.C. Circuit
erred in holding that copyrights are "categorically immune from
challenge[s] under the First Amendment." 60 The respondent now has
to make the tactical decision: to what extent should he box himself
into the corner of defending the categorical test announced by the
Circuit Court; or, at least for the sake of argument, concede a poten-
tial First Amendment claim, and jump right into the merits of the
case? Presumably, respondent will address the First Amendment ar-
guments on the merits.
I am sure that, had the D.C. Circuit Court's analysis been the fi-
nal statement on the matter, future courts, when faced with chal-
lenges to other Congressional actions, would have been able to limit
the Eldred holding to the facts of the case. No matter what the court
said about categorical exclusions, different situations raise different
concerns, and those concerns should be separately addressed in the
context of each case. Since the case will now be decided by the Su-
preme Court, that Court should weigh the copyright and First
Amendment policies in more detail, instead of relying upon a cate-
gorical approach.
57. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
58. See id. at 459-60; Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 226-27.
59. See, e.g., Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 34-37.
60. Id. at 34.
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2. Petitioners' novel theory
Petitioners' argument is based upon the premise that the CTEA
violates the "limited Times" provision of the Copyright Clause.
61
Presumably recognizing that the life of the author plus seventy years,
or ninety-five years, is obviously a "limited time," they seek to link
the limited times provision to a novel interpretation of the Copyright
Clause. They essentially argue that the phrase "to promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts" is synonymous with an increase in
the public domain.62 They argue that Congress may not decrease the
public domain (an issue not before the Court in the Eldred case,
since the CTEA did not remove a single work from the public do-
main).63 Extending their novel theory, they argue that once Con-
gress, pursuant to its constitutional power, has set a term of copy-
right, it is prohibited from extending that term, even if the term has
not yet expired.
64
The gist of petitioners' reasoning is that Congress may only
grant rights when to do so will result in the creation of new works.
Once a work has been created, under whatever inducement existed at
the time of its creation, Congress may not grant any further rights to
the copyright owners, since to do so would be to grant rights without
the "quid pro quo" called for under the Constitution-the creation of
new works.
65
If the D.C. Circuit opinion was objectionable because it was
overly broad, the petitioners' theory is even more objectionable. If
the Court were to adopt the petitioners' reasoning, not only would it
61. See id. at 10-11.
62. See id. at 10.
63. See id.
64. Although several amici take a different position, petitioners concede in
their brief that Congress is the proper body to determine the duration of copy-
right: "Whether 50 years is enough, or 70 years too much, is not a judgment
meet [sic] for this Court." Id. at 14. Petitioners' entire constitutional attack is
directed at the application of the CTEA to existing works; their only argument
against the application of the CTEA to works created after its effective date is
that the different applications of the statute are inseverable. See id. at 47-48.
I find the concession remarkable. It also reintroduces the very same is-
sue that was decided by the D.C. Circuit, but that the Supreme Court specifi-
cally declined to hear: the extent to which courts may consider arguments
raised by amici that are not raised, or are conceded, by the parties to the action.
See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d. 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
65. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 10.
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decide the instant case, but it would have implications in dozens of
other settings. I will respond to the petitioners' argument in the next
section. But let us take a look now at the "parade of horribles" (or,
from petitioners' view, perhaps a "parade of desirables") that might
flow from an adoption of their novel theory.
If the 1998 term extension is unconstitutional, then presumably
the 1994 addition of section 104A, restoring copyright in foreign
works that had already gone into the public domain, would also be
unconstitutional. If that is the case, then the United States would be
in violation of our treaty obligations under NAFTA and WTO, and
there would be serious international repercussions.
If Congress may not extend the term of existing copyrights, as
petitioners argue, then the 1976 extension of copyright to life of the
author plus fifty years was also unconstitutional. If the 1976 exten-
sion is unconstitutional, then we are in violation of the Berne
Treaty,66 with serious international repercussions.
Works used to go into the public domain whenever they failed to
comply with the copyright formalities of notice, registration, and re-
newal. Does that mean that it was unconstitutional in 1988 to dis-
pense with copyright formalities? 67 Was it unconstitutional to "res-
cue" works from going into the public domain when Congress, in
1992, provided for automatic renewal of works published after
1964?6 8 Was it unconstitutional for Congress to expand the scope of
rights in copyrighted works, as it has done many times in the 212-
year history of copyright? Was it unconstitutional when Congress
passed the DMCA, granting new rights in technological protection
systems and copyright management systems, even for works that al-
ready existed?
Petitioners might be delighted at any of the above suggestions.
But the promotion of science and useful arts is allied with, not op-
posed to, the interests of copyright owners. As stated by James
Madison in The Federalist No. 43, "the public good fully
66. Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
July 24, 1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, at 40 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221,
233 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
67. See Beme Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
568, 102 Stat. 2853 (amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1988)).
68. See Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat.
264 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1992)).
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coincides.., with the claims of individuals." 69 As explained by Jus-
tice O'Connor in the Harper & Row case, "it should not be forgotten
that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free ex-
pression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's ex-
pression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and dis-
seminate ideas."7 °  Would it therefore be unconstitutional for
Congress to decrease the rights of copyright, affecting the rights in
existing works, as it did, for example, in the so-called "Fairness in
Music Licensing Act" of 1998?
71
The problem with petitioners' argument is that it would not only
decide the instant case, but it would also frame the issue in practi-
cally every other area of copyright. Petitioners argue that the cate-
gorical approach of the D.C. Circuit is unacceptable because the
court identified no "stopping point" by which to measure what was
constitutional. 72 The petitioners' own argument is unacceptable be-
cause it, too, has no stopping point. It would bar Congress from
making any adjustments in the terms of existing copyrights.
The Supreme Court should therefore not endorse either the cate-
gorical approach of the D.C. Circuit, nor the novel theory of the peti-
tioners. If it affirms the D.C. Circuit, as I believe it should, then it
should make clear that the decision is based upon a full consideration
of the First Amendment standards, and that courts are not foreclosed
in other contexts from considering limitations that may be raised by
the preamble to the Copyright Clause and by the First Amendment.
If it should choose to reverse the D.C. Circuit, and either remand the
case or make a finding on the merits, then it should make clear that it
is deciding only the issue of Congress's power to set the duration of
copyright. It should not adopt any particular "theory" of copyright
that will have an impact on cases beyond the one argued before it.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed.,
1937).
70. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985).
71. Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2830 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1999)).
72. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 13.
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B. The History of the Constitutional Phrase "to promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts"
As stated in the previous section, the petitioners' argument rests
upon the premise that the constitutional phrase "to promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts" is synonymous with placing works
into the public domain. In my amicus brief filed with the Supreme
Court, I review the history of the constitutional phrase "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts," and demonstrate that the
phrase incorporates many factors, not just an increase in the public
domain.73 To focus upon just the one factor is to thwart the meaning
of the constitutional phrase, and to bind Congress in ways inconsis-
tent with the full meaning of the constitutional mandate. Here are
the arguments I make in the brief.
1. The constitutional phrase "the Progress of Science and useful
Arts" is not directed primarily at the ultimate increase in the public
domain
a. the state statutes under the Articles of Confederation
There is little direct record of what the drafters of the Constitu-
tion intended when they adopted the phrase "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts." But much insight can be gleaned from
the practice of the states under the Articles of Confederation, since it
can be assumed that the drafters of the Constitution and of the first
Copyright Act were familiar with the pre-existing state laws.
As seen earlier, the preambles to the state statutes contained lan-
guage of natural rights and property rights. 74 The preambles also
made clear that the inducement contemplated in the statutes was to
"encourage learned and ingenious persons to write" 75 and to "en-
courage men of learning and genius to publish"76 their works. Al-
though works were obviously intended to go into the public domain
at the expiration of the copyrights, the "public good" was not some-
thing that would be achieved only at that later date; the public good
73. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Edward Samuels in Support of Respondent
at 18-22, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618.
74. See discussion supra Part I.C.
75. As stated in the Massachusetts and related statutes.
76. As stated in the Connecticut and related statutes.
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was achieved at the outset by the creation and publication of the
works.
b. the constitutional phrase
The Constitution grants Congress the power to pass copyright
law as follows:
Article I, sec. 8. The Congress shall have Power: ...
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing, for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.77
In The Federalist No. 43, James Madison gave pretty much the only
contemporary public explanation of the phrase when he said:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great
Britain, to be a right of common law.... The public good
fully coincides ... with the claims of individuals. The
States cannot separately make effectual provision [for copy-
right], and most of them have anticipated the decision of
this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
78
By "the public good," Madison could not have meant simply the
public domain, since the "public good" will not "fully coincide...
with the claims of individuals" after the term of copyright has ex-
pired. What he meant was that the progress of science and arts de-
pends entirely upon the creation and distribution of such works.
Madison's focus was, as the Constitution's focus was, as the earlier
state statutes' focus was, primarily on the creation and distribution of
works. 79 Of course, it was assumed that works would ultimately go
into the public domain, but that was as a result of the "limited
Times" provision, not something necessarily envisioned within the
"Progress of Science and useful Arts" clause.
c. the plain meaning and logical understanding of the constitutional
phrase
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution is the only enumerated
power within Article 1, section 8, that mentions the "purpose" for
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
78. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 69, at 279.
79. See id. at 278-79.
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which it was enacted.80 Why might the framers have chosen to add
that language, instead of empowering Congress to grant exclusive
rights to authors and inventors without limitation? Possibly, the
framers were simply following the pattern of the prior state enact-
ments, almost all of which had preambles explaining their purpose.
8 1
The "whereas" clauses in the preambles explained the purposes of
the earlier statutes, but they can hardly be read as specific limitations
upon the rights granted under those statutes.
The other model for the structure of the constitutional phrase
was the Statute of Anne, adopted in England in 1710.82 That Act
was entitled "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting
the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
Copies, during the Times therein mentioned., 83 It is hard to imagine
how the words "Encouragement of Learning" provided any particular
limitation upon what rights were granted.
Petitioners would have us believe that "Science and useful Arts"
does not progress until someone, such as petitioner Eldred, has made
a work available to those who use it free of charge. But that cer-
tainly is not the common sense meaning of "Progress of Science and
useful Arts." Millions of works are created, published, read, and
commented upon every year. Shortly after their publication, some of
the greatest works receive accolades, criticism, and literary and other
awards, for the contribution that they make to the arts and sciences.
For example, the Nobel Prizes are awarded to those who "shall have
conferred the greatest benefit to mankind. 8 4 Under the Nobel rules,
"[t]o be eligible to be considered for a prize, a written work shall
have been issued in print or have been published in another
form .... 85 Pulitzer Prizes are awarded for "work done" and
80. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
81. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.
82. See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21
(Eng.).
83. Id.
84. THE NOBEL FOUNDATION, STATUTES OF THE NOBEL FOUNDATION § 1,
available at http://www.nobel.se/nobel/nobel-foundation/statutes.html (last
visited Aug. 3, 2002).
85. Id. at § 3.
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"published" or "performed" during the prior year.8 6 The public value
of the works is hardly diminished by the fact that they will not go
into the public domain for many years.
Authors who make "transformative" uses of copyrighted works
should and do have wide leeway to produce their works under the
fair use doctrine, as illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.8 7 and the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 88 Petitioners, how-
ever, are not such "creators" who desire to make transformative uses
of existing works; instead, their businesses, for the most part, are in
making already existing works available over the Internet or other-
wise. 89 While this may be a valuable service to the public, it does
not result in any immediate "Progress" of "Science and useful Arts,"
since the works that they distribute are works that have already been
published, almost all of which are already available (though of
course for a fee) from other sources.
90
In short, the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" takes place
primarily when works are created and published, not (or at least not
primarily) when they go into the public domain.
2. United States copyright statutes
a. the Copyright Act of 1790
The first copyright act, passed in 1790 in the first Congress, was
entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the
copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of
such copies, during the times therein mentioned." 91 The legislative
history of the Act confirms that Congress, in passing the Act, was fo-
cusing upon the inducement to create and publish.92 President
86. See THE PULITZER PRIZES, GUIDELINES & FORMS, available at
http://www.pulitzer.org/Entry-Forms/entry-forms.html (last visited Aug. 3,
2002).
87. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
88. 268 F.3d 1257 (2001).
89. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 3-6.
90. See id. at 5.
91. ActofMay 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
92. See THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS 1789-1904: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF ALL PROCEEDINGS IN
CONGRESS IN RELATION TO COPYRIGHT FROM APRIL 15, 1789, TO APRIL 28,
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George Washington, in his January 1790 address to a joint session of
Congress, urged the new Congress that "there is nothing which can
better deserve your patronage than the promotion of science and lit-
erature." 93 He went on: "Whether this desirable object [knowledge]
will be best promoted by affording aids to seminaries of learning al-
ready established, by the institution of a national university, or by
any other expedients, will be well worthy of a place in the delibera-
tions of the legislature." 94 Congress responded with an address to the
President: "We concur with you in the sentiment that... the promo-
tion of science and literature will contribute to the security of a free
Government; in the progress of our deliberations we shall not lose
sight of objects so worthy of our regard. 95 The act that was passed
by Congress and signed into law by President Washington in that
same year was the coyright act, entitled "An Act for the encour-
agement of learning."
The 1790 Act was inconsistent with petitioners' theory that
Congress may not constitutionally extend the duration of existing
works. Most states already had copyright laws that created exclusive
rights for periods varying from a minimum of fourteen to a maxi-
mum of twenty-eight years.97 The 1790 Act not only continued these
copyrights in force, but extended the duration to run for a period of
fourteen to (upon renewal) twenty-eight years from the date of new
registration. This was not some incidental effect, but was quite
clearly set forth in the statute in a separate provision:
1904, FIRST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, TO FIFTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, 2D
SESSION 117 (reprint 1976) (1905).
93. Id. at It5.
94. Id. at 116.
95. Id. at 118.
96. 1 Stat. 124.
97. Actually, the statutes of Pennsylvania and Maryland provided that they
would not apply until copyright statutes had been adopted in all thirteen states,
so presumably copyright was inoperative in those states because Delaware
never adopted a copyright law. Additionally, the statutes of Connecticut, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, North Carolina, and New York
provided that copyright would not extend to works created by authors from
other states unless those other states adopted their own copyright laws. See
generally COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 23 (history of laws passed in
the United States since 1783 relating to copyright). So even in these states,
works by citizens of other states may have gone into the public domain when
they were published.
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Be it enacted ... That from and after the passing of this act,
the author and authors of any map, chart, book or books al-
ready printed within these United States... shall have the
sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending such map, chart, book or books, for the term of
fourteen years from the recording the title thereof in the
clerk's office .... 98
Thus, the authors of existing works, even if they had already re-
ceived up to seven years of protection under the prior state laws
(from 1783 to 1790), or even if their works might have gone into the
public domain because they were from a state that had not yet passed
an effective copyright law, were entitled to begin their copyrights
anew under the 1790 Act.
b. subsequent extensions
All subsequent copyright acts that have extended the term of
copyright-to a total of forty-two years from the date of publication
in 1831 ;99 fifty-six years from publication in 1909;100 life of the au-
thor plus fifty years in 1976;101 and life of the author plus seventy
years in 1998102-have specifically applied the extension to existing
works. This application of new terms to existing works was not
some incidental outcome, but was specifically considered by Con-
gress.
In 1831, when the first term of copyright was extended twenty-
eight years, to create a maximum copyright term of forty-two years,
this result was accomplished by repealing the prior 1790 Act, but
preserving rights under that Act and applying the terms of the new
Act to the existing works.
10 3
Sec. 14. And be it further enacted, That the "Act for the
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such
98. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
99. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
100. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
101. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
102. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2),
301(c), 302, 303, 304 (2000)).
103. See §§ 14-15, 4 Stat. at 439.
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copies during the times therein mentioned," passed May
thirty-first, one thousand seven hundred and ninety, and the
act supplementary thereto.., shall be, and the same are
hereby, repealed: saving, always, such rights as may have
been obtained in conformity to their provisions.
Sec. 15. And be it further enacted, That all and several
the provisions of this act, intended for the protection and
security of copyrights, and providing remedies, penalties,
and forfeitures.., shall be held and construed to extend to
the benefit of the legal proprietor or proprietors of each and
every copyright heretofore obtained, according to law, dur-
ing the term thereof, in the same manner as if such copy-
right had been entered and secured according to the direc-
tions of this act.
104
The 1909 Act, which extended the renewal term of copyright by
an additional fourteen years for a total copyright term of up to fifty-
six years, made clear that it did not revive works that had already
gone into the public domain; but the extension of the additional four-
teen years did apply to copyrights that had been obtained under the
prior act and had not yet expired.10 5
Sec. 7. ... [N]o copyright shall subsist in the original text
of any work which is in the public domain, or in any work
which was published in this country or any foreign country
prior to... [July 1, 1909] and has not been already copy-
righted in the United States .... 106
In the twenty years of legislative history leading up to the 1976
Act, Congress carefully considered the varying means for measuring
the term of copyright. Although it adopted the life-plus-50-year term
for works created after the effective date of the statute, Congress
chose to continue to measure the term of existing copyrights (and
works-for-hire and pseudonymous and anonymous works) from the
date of publication.
104. Id.
105. See 35 Stat. at 1075.
106. Id. at 1077.
107. The 1976 Act provided that anonymous works, pseudonymous works,
and works-for-hire would be protected for seventy-five years from publication,
or 100 years from the date of creation, whichever expired first. The CTEA
provides that such works are protected for ninety-five years from publication
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Under the 1976 Act, life plus fifty years actually resulted in a
shorter duration of copyright for works produced toward the end of
an author's life. Such works would be protected for a little over fifty
years, less than the fifty-six-year maximum under the 1909 law.
Congress concluded that, on average, the life of the author plus fifty
years was the equivalent of about seventy-five years from publica-
tion; but, of course, in individual instances, it might be more or less.
That is the inevitable result of using two different methods for com-
puting the duration of copyright.
Congress considered that it might be unfair to grant the benefits
of the nineteen-year term extension to licensees who may have paid
only for a shorter license term. Accordingly, Congress established in
section 304(c) an elaborate provision for "termination," or recapture,
of the extension term for the benefit of the authors or their heirs.
10 8
In this way, the term extension was not necessarily a "victory" for
the large corporations that may have owned many of the copyrights,
since in many cases they had to renegotiate the rights with the origi-
nal authors or their heirs.
While Congress in 1976 extended the term of copyright for
works that had already been published, it significantly decreased the
term of protection for works that were not yet published. 10 9 Under
prior law from 1790 through 1977, state common law copyright in
unpublished works had extended in perpetuity. 110 Under the new
Act, Congress brought works under the federal system of copyright
beginning from the date of "fixation" in a "tangible medium of
expression" (rather than from the date of publication) and preempted
state common law copyright in all such works, including unpublished
works."' In section 303, Congress provided that copyright in previ-
ously created but unpublished works would be measured by the life-
plus-50-year term. 112  However, in order to prevent "old"
or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first. Petitioners can hardly
complain about the 100 or 120-year periods from the date of creation, since
those terms are much shorter than the rights "in perpetuity" that applied to un-
published works from 1790 through 1977. See infra this Section.
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1976).
109. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
110. See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 222-
23 (2000) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATED STORY].
111. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 301(a) (1976).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
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unpublished works from immediately going into the public domain,
Congress provided that no such works would go into the public do-
main before December 31, 2002, at the earliest. And, to encourage
publication of such old works, Congress provided that if such old
works were published by the end of the year 2002, they would be
granted additional protection until the year 2027.113 In any event,
since the duration of copyright for unpublished works was reduced
from "in perpetuity," and since some copyrights actually received a
shorter term of copyright under the new Act, the net effect of the
1976 Act was not simply to "extend" the term of copyright, but more
precisely to "adjust" the term of copyright." 
4
While Congress's prior enactments, of course, do not defini-
tively decide the constitutional issue in the Eldred case, they do
evince a practice of careful deliberation that has been clear and con-
sistent from the Copyright Act of 1790 to the Copyright Act of 1998.
Each of these statutes, affecting the terms of existing as well as fu-
ture copyrights, is inconsistent with the novel constitutional theory
proposed by petitioners.
c. other copyright acts
Extension of the copyright term is not the only way in which
Congress has expanded the scope of copyright over the years. A few
examples include: owners of previously copyrighted works saw their
rights expand when Congress added the right to receive payment un-
der a compulsory licensing system for cable retransmissions in
1976; 115 a public display right in 1976;116 certain moral rights in
1990; 117 and digital performance rights in sound recordings in
1992.118 Such additional rights could not possibly represent an in-
centive to the original copyright owners to create their works; and so,
by petitioners' logic, Congress should never have been able to add to
the rights in such works already in existence. Yet it is absurd to as-
sume that Congress does not have the power to make periodic ad-
justments to the scope of existing copyrights.
113. See id.
114. See 90 Stat. at 2573.
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
116. See id. § 106(5).
117. See id. § 106A.
118. See id. § 106(6).
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Congress has "decreased" the public domain (in the sense that it
has passed laws slowing the rate at which works go into the public
domain) in many other ways besides the extension of the copyright
term. For example, many more works have traditionally gone into
the public domain as a result of failure to use the copyright notice,
failure to register, or failure to renew, than have gone into the public
domain because of expiration of copyright. 119 When Congress in
1988 eliminated the copyright notice and registration requirements as
part of its obligations under the Berne Convention, 20 and when in
1992 it provided for automatic renewal of copyrights still in their
first terms, it rescued many more existing works from going into the
public domain than it did when it passed the CTEA. Again, by peti-
tioners' logic, these "assaults" on the public domain should never
have been allowed. The fact that Congress has continually read-
justed not only the term of copyright, but also the scope of rights in
existing copyrights, and has abandoned the requirement of formali-
ties, also for existing copyrights, demonstrates that Congress simply
is not limited in the novel way suggested by petitioners.
3. The "Progress of Science and useful Arts" involves dozens of
considerations beyond merely the devolution of copyrighted works
into the public domain
a. international considerations
One of the major accomplishments in U.S. copyright in the latter
part of the twentieth century was the internationalization of copyright
standards, prompted to a large extent by the internationalization of
trade and technology. The 1790 Act protected only U.S. authors.
12 1
It was not until 1891 that foreign authors were granted at least some
minimal level of protection, though that protection, because of copy-
right formalities, was often more illusory than real. In 1952, the
United States was instrumental in convincing much of the world to
adopt the Universal Copyright Convention, which allowed a
119. If, as petitioners assert in their brief, only thirteen percent of copy-
righted works were generally renewed, then eighty-seven percent of the works
went into the public domain when they were not renewed. See Petitioners
Brief, supra note 21, at 7.
120. See Berne Convention, supra note 66, at 40.
121. See § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
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U.S.-inspired international copyright system to exist alongside the
Berne Convention that governed most of the, rest of the world.
122
The situation was an embarrassment within the international copy-
right community, and undermined the ability of U.S. trade negotia-
tors to encourage other countries to enhance their copyright protec-
tion of foreign-including U.S.-books, music, movies, and
computer programs. Finally, in 1988, the United States joined the
rest of the world by adhering to the Berne Convention. 1
23
The Berne Convention provides that all member countries must
protect copyright for a minimum term of life of the author plus fifty
years, 124 and eliminate all formalities as prerequisites to copyright.1
25
The extension of copyright to life plus fifty years, as provided in the
major overhaul of U.S. copyright law in 1976, and the elimination of
formalities in the Berne Implementation Act of 1988, were therefore
absolute prerequisites to U.S. adherence to Berne.
Not only does Berne require a term of life of the author plus
fifty years, but it also requires that member countries grant that term
to all works that have not already gone into the public domain in a
particular country.126 As provided in Article 18(1): "This Conven-
tion shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its coming into
force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of
origin through the expiry of the term of protection."' 127 Thus, the
term extension for existing works still under copyright protection
was an absolute necessity for joining Berne under Article 18(l). 128
122. See Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731.
123. See ILLUSTRATED STORY, supra note 110, at 230-48.
124. See Berne Convention, supra note 66, at 41.
125. See id. art. 5(2).
126. See id. art. 7.
127. Id. art. 18(1).
128. There is a limited exception in Article 18(2), which provides that "[i]f,
however, through the expiry of the term of protection which was previously
granted, a work has fallen into the public domain of the country where protec-
tion is claimed, that work shall not be protected anew." Id. art. 18(2). In addi-
tion, under Article 18(3), there is some room for member countries to deter-
mine "the conditions of application of this principle." Id. art. 18(3). There
was a vigorous debate at the time of U.S. adherence to Berne whether Article
18 required the United States to "restore" copyright in works that had gone into
the public domain as the result of a failure to meet the notice and registration
formalities. See U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearing on the Im-
plications Both Domestic and International, of US. Adherence to the Interna-
tional Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Before the S.
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The 1998 extension, from life of the author plus fifty years to
life of the author plus seventy years, was not required under interna-
tional obligations. However, it was designed to match the term of
copyright recently adopted throughout the European Union and by
other countries. Under Article 7(8) of the Berne Convention, coun-
tries with the life-plus-70-year term do not have to recognize the
rights of foreign authors whose works have expired in their own
countries. 1
29
Since the United States is a net exporter of copyrighted works, it
certainly made sense for the United States to grant the longer term,
and thereby allow U.S. authors to take advantage of the longer term
available abroad. Furthermore, since the United States was simply
matching the longer term available in other countries, it is not likely
that Congress, absent the strong international considerations, will ex-
tend the U.S. term of copyright yet again. Petitioners' suggestion
that Congress will continue to grant further extensions whenever the
copyright industries ask for them is simply not a likely scenario.
The petitioners suggest that the drafters of the Constitution
would be horrified at a term of life plus seventy years, or ninety-five
years for existing works. In 1790, the term of copyright adopted by
Congress matched the British, and what would become the interna-
tional standard of the day. Would the framers of the Constitution be
shocked to learn that Congress had, over the years, extended the term
of copyright to match the expanding international norm? It is more
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 99th Cong. 493 (1987) (Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention), reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 513, 587 (1986) (discussing retroactivity provisions of Article 18 of
the Beme Convention). A consensus developed that the United States did not
necessarily have to restore such works. See id. at 592-94.
While Article 18 arguably allowed the United States not to restore
works that had fallen into the public domain because of a failure of copyright
formalities, the term extension for existing works still under copyright protec-
tion was an absolute necessity for joining Berne. The United States was ap-
parently able under subsection (3) to determine that it would comply with Arti-
cle 18 by granting a fixed term of seventy-five years to existing copyrights (on
average the equivalent of life plus fifty years). There was at least some argu-
ment that the seventy-five-year term in some cases yielded less than the life-
plus-50-year term required by Berne; the life-plus-70-year term of the CTEA
thus shored up United States law against any challenge based upon this argu-
ment.
129. See Beme Convention, supra note 66, art. 7(8).
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likely that they would be shocked if we had not done so. Were
Madison to view the state of international trade and technology to-
day, he might well conclude, as he did about the individual state stat-
utes in 1790, that one country "cannot separately make effectual pro-
vision" for copyright, and that most countries today have




While the exact contours of the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts" are not clear, many of the major theories and limitations of
copyright adopted over the years were intended to, and do in fact,
promote such progress.
For example, the Supreme Court has recognized the "First
Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment tradi-
tionally afforded by fair use." 13 1 Works of utility are not covered by
copyright, but are free for the taking.' 32 The first sale doctrine, 133 the
numerous compulsory licenses, the limitations in section 110 protect-
ing various performances, and the exclusion of protection for gov-
ernment works 134 all carve out major limitations that promote the
progress of science and arts. The limitation of copyright protection
to "original works of authorship,"' 35 the special rules for library pho-
tocopying, 136 the many definitional limitations in section 101, and
the fact that copyright does not prevent all uses of copyrighted
works, but only those enumerated in the exclusive rights sections 106
and 106A, all in their own way foster the "Progress of Science and
useful Arts." There is hardly a principle of copyright that does not
reflect a careful balance between the rights of copyright owners and
copyright users. Presumably, it is precisely because the balance is so
130. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 69, at 279.
131. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985).
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculp-
tural works").
133. See id. § 109.
134. See id. § 105.
135. Id. § 102.
136. See id. § 108.
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intricate and delicate that the framers of the Constitution assigned to
Congress the task of setting copyright policy.
c. the CTEA
In enacting the CTEA, Congress again gave careful considera-
tion to balancing the interests of copyright owners and copyright us-
ers. For example, Congress coupled copyright term extension with
the so-called "Fairness in Music Licensing Act," which, in amending
section 110(5) and adding section 513, put severe limitations on the
enforcement of public performance rights by music copyright hold-
ers. Responding to the concerns raised by library representatives,
Congress added a new subsection 108(h), which provides for an ex-
panded library exemption for the reproduction of copyrighted works
during the last twenty years added by the Act. 1
37
As previously explained, old unpublished works were slated to
go into the public domain after December 31, 2002.138 As originally
proposed, the CTEA would have extended the protection of such
works by an extra ten years. 139 Responding to the concerns raised in
the committee hearings, however, Congress determined that no ex-
tension should be given for the protection of these works (although
Congress did extend by twenty years, to 2047,140 the "extra" protec-
tion granted to such works as an inducement to get them published
by the end of 2002). Thus, thousands, or millions, of unpublished
works, including private letters dating back to the early history of the
United States, will first go into the public domain after December 31,
2002, demonstrating Congress's sensitivity to the value of the public
domain.
As with the 1976 term extension, Congress was concerned that
the authors or their heirs, rather than the copyright licensees, be the
ones to receive the benefit of the twenty-year term extension. Ac-
cordingly, Congress provided a new termination right in section
304(d) for authors or heirs who did not previously take advantage of
the termination provided in section 304(c).
141
137. See id. § 108(h).
138. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
139. See S. REP. No. 104-315, at 5-6 (1996).
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
141. See id. § 304(d).
Fall 2002]
420 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:389
Congress did not provide, either in 1976 or in 1998, for a termi-
nation right in works-for-hire. However, in the CTEA, Congress did
take the extraordinary step of adopting a sense that owners of audio-
visual works should make arrangements to share the value of the ad-
ditional twenty-year extension with those who participated in the
creation of the works.142 Section 105 of the CTEA provides:
It is the sense of the Congress that copyright owners of
audiovisual works for which the term of copyright protec-
tion is extended by the amendments made by this title, and
the screenwriters, directors, and performers of those audio-
visual works, should negotiate in good faith in an effort to
reach a voluntary agreement or voluntary agreements with
respect to the establishment of a fund or other mechanism
for the amount of remuneration to be divided among the
parties for the exploitation of those audiovisual works.'
4 3
Although this sense of Congress does not have the force of law, it
presumably puts the industry on notice that, should such negotiations
not be forthcoming, Congress might consider enacting legislation to
force the copyright owners to share the benefits of the copyright term
extension (assuming, of course, that the Supreme Court does not bar
Congress from making ongoing adjustments to existing rights of
copyright).
Thus, it is clear that Congress in the 1998 legislation continued
doing what it has been doing for the full 212 years of copyright in
this country: promoting the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" by
carefully balancing the interests of copyright owners and copyright
users.
d. copyright balances
In their amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court petitioning
for certiorari, the law professors in support of the petitioners specu-
lated about the impact the appellate court's ruling might have on the
DMCA, the restoration of foreign copyrights under section 104A,
various other recent enactments, and potential enactments that have
142. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
§ 105, 112 Stat. 2827, 2829 (1998).
143. Id.
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not yet even been considered by Congress. 144 The professors were
concerned about the impact on court interpretations of the DMCA,
particularly involving potential idea/expression and fair use argu-
ments.145 The law professors did not stress the point in their filing on
the merits, and I did not include the following analysis in my own
amicus brief.
In deciding whether the CTEA is constitutional or not, the Su-
preme Court must make an all-or-nothing choice. Congress, on the
other hand, is the proper body for weighing competing considera-
tions and coming up with a "compromise" that protects the interests
of all parties. That is exactly what it did in the CTEA when it ex-
panded the library exemption during the added twenty-year term, and
when it limited the scope of the musical performance right by vari-
ous amendments placing restrictions on performing rights societies.
In the future, Congress might adopt any number of other com-
promises to assure the continued "Progress of Science and useful
Arts." Congress might conclude that the longer term is not appropri-
ate for some categories of works, and adopt a shorter term for such
works as works of applied art, as is allowed under the Berne Conven-
tion. If Congress is concerned about the availability of older works
that are still the subject of copyright, it might adopt a compulsory li-
cense to cover the situation, much as it provided for a compulsory li-
cense for the continued use of derivative works by reliance parties
based upon works whose copyright was restored under section
104A. 146 For example, the Connecticut statute of 1783 provided that,
if an author "shall neglect to furnish the public with sufficient edi-
tions thereof, or shall sell the same at a price unreasonable," then a
court was empowered to grant a complainant "a full and ample li-
cence [sic] to re-print and publish such book, pamphlet, map or chart,
in such numbers and for such term as said court shall judge just and
reasonable."'
147
I do not advocate such a compromise, but the fact remains that
there are plenty of ways, short of judicially throwing works into the
144. See Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Intellectual
Property Professors Brief Supporting Petitioners].
145. See id. at 26-27.
146. See supra Part I.D.
147. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 23, at 2-3.
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public domain, to protect any legitimate copyright user and First
Amendment concerns. The copyright laws do not raise such consti-
tutional concerns as they currently exist, precisely because Congress
and the courts have seen fit to impose the idea/expression, fair use,
compulsory license, and other limitations on the rights of copyright.
It is not necessary or appropriate to speculate whether any future
copyright law, no matter how absurd, might be unconstitutional. The
only issue is whether Congress, in passing the law it did, acted within
its constitutional authority, including promoting the "Progress of
Science and useful Arts," properly understood to incorporate a wide
range of concerns. That is precisely the role that Congress is situated
to play, and that is presumably the reason that the Constitution grants
Congress the power to set the parameters of copyright law.
The reason I cut this argument from my amicus brief was that it
might have seemed to suggest that there was some less drastic alter-
native that Congress could have passed, such as ones containing the
above-contemplated compulsory license, and that the Supreme Court
should declare the law unconstitutional until Congress adopts the
balance that the Court deems preferable. But if there are less drastic
alternatives, or if there are other ways of promoting the legitimate in-
terests of the public domain, by compulsory licenses or other de-
vices, then we should all go back to Congress and discuss those sug-
gestions. The public domain literature has certainly served its
purpose of highlighting concerns that may not have been adequately
voiced before, and for that reason much of the literature does make a
valuable contribution, despite my criticisms here and elsewhere. I do
not think that it would be appropriate, however, for the Supreme
Court to make the ultimately legislative decision about what compul-
sory licenses or limiting doctrines should be adopted in each context.
4. The briefs--conclusion
The Copyright Act is a series of compromises and balances
among competing interests. It would be unfair, and perhaps impos-
sible, to unravel one part of this Act without upsetting the careful
balance that only Congress is in a position to achieve. The point was
well made by Ralph Oman, former Register of Copyrights, in a letter
to the editor of the Washington Post on March 11, 2002:
During the past 90 years, to solve political controversies
and to hand out economic freebies to sympathetic
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supplicants, Congress has sweet-talked authors into giving
up their right to say yes or no to a use of their works-the
essence of a property right-in exchange for a longer term.
A long list of special pleaders now gets free use of copy-
righted works, including small businesses, veterans' groups,
bars, scholars, restaurants, fraternal groups, marching
bands, Boy Scout troops, nursing homes, libraries, radio
broadcasters and home tapers. Another long list of power-
ful industries gets to use copyrighted works in exchange for
a small government-set fee, whether the author likes it or
not: cable and satellite companies, record companies, juke-
box operators, public broadcasters and, most recently,
Internet companies.
The authors went along with this coerced subsidization
because Congress held out the promise of a longer term of
protection. It would be a switch-a-roo worthy of Lucy
yanking away Charlie Brown's football if the Supreme
Court removed the carrot and left the authors with the dirty
end of the stick.14
8
C. Rebuttal
There are several misrepresentations or mischaracterizations in
the petitioners' presentation of the case. Most of what follows are
responses I make in the footnotes of my amicus brief.
1. The number of copyright extensions
Petitioners state throughout their brief that Congress has ex-
tended the term of copyright "eleven times in the past forty years."'
149
This is a statement that also appears throughout Lawrence Lessig's
most recent book, 150 and that many public domain advocates seem to
enjoy repeating. These statements are misleading, if not downright
disingenuous. In the past ninety years (since the 1909 Act estab-
lished a maximum duration of fifty-six years), the term has been ba-
sically extended only twice, to life of the author plus fifty years in
148. Ralph Oman, Letter to Editor, A Whittling Away of Copyrights, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at A20, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5785-2002Mar1 0.
149. See, e.g., Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 2.
150. See generally LESSIG, supra note 19 (discussing copyright term).
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1978, and to life of the author plus seventy years in 1998. The other
nine extensions were interim extensions for roughly one or two-year
periods, enacted between 1962 and 1974, so that copyrighted works
would not go into the public domain pending adoption of the new
seventy-five-year term for existing copyrights. 151 In no case did the
extension exceed the seventy-five-year term that was ultimately
adopted by Congress in the 1976 Act.
Congress has hardly been headstrong in extending the term of
copyright. In 1909 and throughout the twentieth century, many ad-
vocates of copyright proposed rejection of the "outmoded" structure
of the Statute of Anne, and adoption of the life-plus-50-year system
that prevailed in most of the rest of the world. Had Congress
adopted the more modern term in 1909, instead of 1976, there would
have been only two term extensions in the last 170 years (since the
extension to a maximum of forty-two years in 1831), instead of the
last ninety years.
2. The belittling of international considerations
In his book, The Future of Ideas, Lawrence Lessig explains the
"repeated" extensions of copyright as being a power-grabbing ploy
of the giant corporations.152 At various websites on the Eldred case,
the slogan "Free the Mouse" is prominently displayed, and public
domain advocates seem to enjoy calling the CTEA the "Mickey
Mouse Act."' 153 In his book, Lessig pretty much dismisses the inter-
national considerations that were at the heart of copyright term ex-
tension.' 54 The briefs belittle the international considerations.
151. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873; Act of
Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181; Act of Nov. 24, 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490; Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat.
1441; Act of Dec. 16, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360; Act of July 23,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397; Act of Nov. 16, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
141, 81 Stat. 464; Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581; Act
of Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555.
152. See generally LESSIG, supra note 19 (discussing copyright extension).
153. The slogan used to be accompanied by a stylized "logo" looking like
Mickey Mouse with lines through it, but they have recently dropped that logo.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft website at http://eldred.cc/ (last visited Aug. 8,
2002) (site compiling information regarding the Eldred v. Ashcroft case).
154. One of Lessig's proposals is that the United States adopt a copyright
system of five-year terms subject to renewals. In a footnote, Lessig concedes
that "[s]ome of the changes I propose here would require changes to or the ab-
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Some of the public domain literature argues that the interna-
tional considerations are irrelevant to the issue, since the rest of the
world obviously is not subject to the United States Constitution, as is
Congress. However, although the laws of other countries may reflect
different cultures and different histories, it is nevertheless instructive
to consider how other nations have set about dealing with common
problems of enforcing copyright in an emerging global technology.
As stated by Justice Breyer in Printz v. US.:155
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not
those of other nations, and there may be relevant political
and structural differences between their systems and our
own.... But their experience may nonetheless cast an em-
pirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a
common legal problem .... 
156
3. The arguments against "harmonization"
It is true that the adoption of the CTEA did not result in com-
plete harmonization with foreign copyright laws. A lot of the "dis-
harmony" that petitioners and several amici observe results from
measuring new copyrights from the date of the author's death, while
measuring old, and some new, copyrights from the date of publica-
tion. Petitioners try to make much of the inevitable disparity. For
example, they state that "[a]s applied to an author who produced
throughout a long lifetime in the pattern of Irving Berlin, the current
rule would produce a term of 140 years."'157 The statement is mis-
leading. The 140-year term would apply only to Berlin's early
works; works produced shortly before his death would endure only
for a little over seventy years under the CTEA. In any event, most of
the disharmonies, both between the laws of different countries and
internally within U.S. law, result from other decisions made about
other aspects of copyright, such as the treatment of works-for-hire.
rogation of some treaties," particularly the Beme Convention, the TRIPS/WTO
agreement, and the two WIPO treaties. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 330 n.14.
But to "change or abrogate" major international copyright law is hardly a sim-
ple matter, and could cause untold hardships to some American copyright in-
dustries.
155. 521 U.S. 898,977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 977 (citation omitted) (discussion in context of the Brady Act).
157. Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 3.
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If there are problems in the nonuniform treatment of those aspects,
then those aspects should be addressed separately.
4. The stationers' company acts
Several briefs in favor of petitioners link the Statute of Anne to
the prior history of monopolies under the Stationers' Companies Li-
censing Acts. About this linkage, I refer to my book:
Some modem critics of the expansion of copyright delight
in emphasizing the embarrassing precursor to the Statute of
Anne, suggesting that copyright has been forever tainted by
the fact that it evolved from what were essentially censor-
ship laws. However, there was a critical gap in protection,
from 1694 through 1710, and the new Statute of Anne was
not simply an extension of the previous law. Parliament
seems not to have been guided by the complaints of the
publishers, who in 1709 had lobbied for a return to the old
licensing acts. Instead, they were obviously influenced by
the pleas of several famous authors for the recognition of
rights not of printers, but of authors ....
One way of putting the Stationers' Licensing Acts into
perspective is to realize that they were not the spiritual pre-
cursors to copyright at all. However, because the crown
and the publishers had found a way to protect the rights of
publishers, and the publishers were accordingly willing to
pay authors for their creations, a satisfactory solution had
been worked out that eased the pressure for a more direct
copyright law to protect authors. Once the stopgap measure
was removed, the need for the protection of authors' rights
came to the fore. 15
8
5. Quotes supporting short copyright terms
It is not hard to find quotations in the public discourse that ad-
vocate a shorter term of copyright. As stated in the reports to ac-
company the 1976 Act, "[t]he debate over how long a copyright
should last is as old as the oldest copyright statute and will doubtless
158. See ILLUSTRATED STORY, supra note 110, at 16-17.
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continue as long as there is a copyright law." 159 The petitioners and
their amici supply dozens of quotes from one side of this debate to
create the impression that there was general consensus on the short-
est possible copyright term. One can only marvel at the audacity of
Professor Ochoa and others, who attach to their brief a seven-page
appendix of an anonymous letter strenuously advocating one side of
this debate almost 300 years ago. 160 The "consensus" that actually
developed over the years in this country, in England, and throughout
the European Union is a copyright term of life plus seventy years.
6. The relevance of the Internet
Although the issue before the Supreme Court does not directly
involve the Internet or other new technologies, petitioners and sev-
eral amici in favor of petitioners suggest that their interests are allied
with the Internet, and that a decision against them will somehow in-
hibit the development of this new technology. For example, peti-
tioners suggest that Eldred's website is simply the Internet equivalent
of a public library, and that he should be entitled to some online
equivalent of the first sale doctrine. 161
If Eldred wants to "compile" a "collection" of Robert Frost
books, he is perfectly free to do so under the first sale doctrine. But
if petitioners think that posting HTML versions of those works on
their Internet website is or should be the online equivalent of the
Derry New Hampshire Public Library's lending of a particular copy
to members of their community, then they are fundamentally wrong.
The Derry library maintains individual copies of their books; when
they are lent out, they are unavailable to others. Works that are
"posted" on the Internet, on the other hand, can be viewed simulta-
neously by hundreds or thousands of users, copied instantaneously to
their computers, and redistributed in multiple copies around the
world. As demonstrated by the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992,162 the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
159. S. REP. No. 94-473, at 133 (1975); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476
(1976).
160. See Brief Amici Curiae Tyler T. Ochoa et al. in Support of Petitioners
(Historians Brief), Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618.
161. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 5-6.
162. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C., ch. 10 (1992)).
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1995,163 and the DMCA, 164 the proper congressional response to the
digitization and posting of works is not a blanket exemption, but a
careful balancing of interests. Even with the first sale doctrine, li-
braries are also subject to the elaborate provisions of section 108 to
ensure that their copies are not systematically used to make copies of
works.
165
If petitioners want a "first sale" equivalent for the Internet, they
will have to convince Congress of its advisability. Their ability or
inability to get a special exemption during the life of a particular
copyright, however, should have nothing to do with the issue before
the Supreme Court: Whether Congress acted within its constitutional
authority when it extended the duration of copyright in the CTEA.
Petitioners argue that their view of the public domain is made
more urgent by the development of new markets for creative works,
particularly the Internet. 16 6 The response by Congress to the devel-
opment of new markets, however-particularly new technologies for
exploiting copyrighted works-is generally to give the copyright
owners or the original creators or their heirs an opportunity to get
some benefit from that new market. Sometimes this is achieved
through a compulsory license, such as the compulsory license pro-
vided in the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.167 Sometimes it is
achieved by creating new rights, such as was provided in the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.168 Sometimes
when it expands rights to include new markets, Congress allows new
parties to participate. For example, in the Audio Home Recording
Act, Congress for the first time provided that some of the compul-
sory licensing fees be set aside for the benefit of artists who had
163. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. (1996)).
164. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104 and adding 17 U.S.C.,
ch. 12 (1998)).
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
166. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 38.
167. 106 Stat. at 4237.
168. 109 Stat. at 336. And sometimes Congress chooses not to extend the
rights of existing parties to new technologies. For example, the Sound Re-
cording Amendment of 1971 applied only to recordings made after its effective
date in 1972 and did not create rights in recordings already made. See Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
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helped to create the recordings, regardless of their underlying con-
tracts.' 69 And in the 1995 legislation (amended in 1998) that created
a compulsory license for certain webcasting on the Internet, perform-
ing artists were also allotted a substantial portion of the proceeds. 1
70
This desire to give copyright owners an opportunity and an in-
centive to exploit the new market represented by the Internet was
specifically considered by Congress when it adopted the CTEA.171
Congress did not restore the copyright in any works that had already
gone into the public domain. But it certainly was a legitimate con-
cern to give some additional period of time for current copyright
owners to exploit their works using the new media and technologies.
It would otherwise seem ironic, perhaps unfair, to some copyright
owners that their rights in creative works should expire just as the
Internet made possible the development of new means for realizing
some value from those works.
7. Copyright's quid pro quo
Petitioners recognize in their brief the "quid pro quo require-
ment of the Copyright Clause."'172 Under copyright law from 1790
through 1977, publication was generally the prerequisite for federal
copyright. Since 1978, the only requirement has been "fixation" of
an original work "in a tangible medium of expression."' 73  Even
169. See 17 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (2000).
170. See id. § 114(g).
171. As stated in S. REP. NO. 104-315, at6 (1996):
[U]nprecedented growth in technology, including the advent of digital
media and the development of the National Information Infrastructure
(Nil) and the Global Information Infrastructure (GII), have dramati-
cally enhanced the marketable life of creative works, as well as the po-
tential for increased incentives to preserve existing works.
As recited at page 12 of that report, the Register of Copyrights noted before the
Committee in 1995:
Technological developments clearly have extended the commercial
life of copyrighted works. Examples include video cassettes, which
have given new life to movies and television series, expanded cable
television, satellite delivery, which promise up to 500 channels
thereby creating a demand for content, the advent of multimedia,
which also is creating a demand for content, and international net-
works such as Internet, i.e., the global information highway. The
question is who should benefit from these increased commercial uses?
172. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 23.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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though copyrighted works are thus protected from the date of their
creation, it is the genius of the copyright system that copyright own-
ers only profit by making their works available to others, so they
(and their publishers) still have an incentive to publish. Thus, while
the particular expression may be protected, the ideas and facts and
other noncopyrightable aspects of the works are made available to
the public. 1
74
The quid pro quo is for the volitional acts of creating and pub-
lishing works. If part of the social "contract" is that works ultimately
go into the public domain, then that aspect of the "bargain" is some-
thing of an adhesion contract for the authors. They have no choice
whether or when their work goes into the public domain, and can
hardly be said to have acquiesced to any particular duration for pro-
tection of their works.
To continue the contract analogy, the contract with the author is
not something that comes to an end upon creation, or even upon first
publication of a work. Rather, the rights and incentives are more in
the nature of an executory contract, with ongoing incentives to con-
tinue to distribute the work for the entire period of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights.
8. Mischaracterization of effect of automatic renewal
Petitioners argue that the problems they associate with the copy-
right term extension are compounded by the fact that "renewal" has
been "automatic" since 1992.175 They argue that 375,000 copyrights
have been "blocked" in order to "protect" 77,000 commercially vi-
able works. 176 They then argue that "under current law," as a result
of automatic renewal, "3.35 million works would be blocked to pro-
tect 77,000."' 177 That is a mischaracterization of the effects of the
law. The 1992 amendment that made renewal automatic applies to
works that were created between 1964 and 1977, inclusive. The only
works created between 1923 and 1963 that were still under copy-
right, and therefore subject to the 1998 term extension, were those
that were in fact renewed by the copyright owners. Those works
published between 1923 and 1963 that were not registered for
174. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
175. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 7, 30 n.13.
176. See id. at 7.
177. Id.
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renewal have already gone into the public domain, and were not ex-
tended by the CTEA.
9. Mischaracterization of fair use cases
The petitioners' intellectual property law professors' brief states
that "[o]ne of the most troubling aspects of copyright in recent years
is that the limitations on copyright liability, including the idea-
expression distinction and fair use, have been steadily shrinking via
judicial construction."'1 78 This statement is absolutely wrong. The
Supreme Court's clarification of the wide scope of fair use in a par-
ody context, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 179 has been em-
braced by the lower courts. 180 In the context of new technologies,
the Supreme Court held in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 181 that fair use included the "time-shifting" of televi-
sion programs through the use of home video recorders. The Su-
preme Court's holding in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,182 while not an "idea/expression" case, was founded
upon the related fact/expression distinction. Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 18 3 and similar cases have resulted in a
"thin" copyright for computer programs, based upon concepts related
to the idea/expression distinction and the works of utility doctrine.
The holding in Recording Industry Ass 'n of America v. Diamond
Multimedia Systems, Inc. 184 that the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992 does not apply to the popular RIO MP3 music player, while de-
cided on the technicalities of that statute, was a major victory in what
might be considered a fair use context. It is hard to imagine how the
copyright law professors can conclude that the basic limitations of
copyright have not been doing their historical job of balancing the
rights of copyright owners and users.
178. Intellectual Property Professors Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note
144, at 26.
179. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
180. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11 th
Cir. 2001); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.
1998).
181. 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984).
182. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
183. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
184. 180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
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10. Economic efficiency analysis
a. the economists' brief
The petitioners' economists' brief begins with the statement:
"One possibility is that Congress sought a policy that confers a net
economic benefit, after subtracting the expected costs."' 85 This is a
pretty telling statement, since it sets up the entire brief as based upon
a policy that it does not even say Congress adopted.
Despite the attempts by some scholars to test all copyrights on
the Procrustean bed of economic efficiency analysis, Congress has
simply never limited itself to such an approach. The moral rights
provided in section 106A, the termination rights of sections 203 and
304(c), and dozens of other rights and limitations do not lend them-
selves to economic evaluation.
One of the basic problems with an efficiency analysis of copy-
right is that many of the variables involved in the copyright indus-
tries simply are not quantifiable. For example, in making the argu-
ment that increased revenues for the copyright industries will not
result in any greater investment in future works, the economists
blithely suggest that "[i]n general, a profit-maximizing producer
should fund the set of projects that have an expected return equal to
or greater than their cost of capital."'' 86 One is reminded of the pro-
verbial critic who, upon being told that only one out of ten movies
makes money, responded, "[t]hen only invest in the ones that make
money." Of course, if one knew in advance which multi-million-
dollar movies would be successful, one would have no difficulty
making money.
The fact is that the copyright industries are based upon products
that usually have, at the outset, an undeterminable value. One book
sells, another does not; one movie is a blockbuster, the other a disas-
ter. If one were to do an economic analysis, one would probably
conclude that, given the unlikelihood of success, it is hardly ever
worth publishing a book or producing a play or a movie. It is pre-
cisely because the chance of success is so small that we have to make
the reward for success great. The copyright industries are made up,
185. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners (Economist Brief) at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618.
186. Id. at 9.
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to a large extent, of what the economists call "sub-par projects," and
it would be a mistake to leave to the economists the choice of which
works to subsidize.
b. the petitioners' brief
Petitioners make an argument similar to that contained in the
economists' brief, that the cost to society of "withholding" lots of
copyrighted works exceeds the "gain" to be realized by those few
copyright holders who have "surviving works" (defined by petition-
ers as "works that continue to earn a royalty"). 187 The argument is
fallacious.
The petitioners effectively divide all works into two categories:
those that have commercial viability, and those that do not. For
those that do not have commercial viability after dozens of years-
the vast majority of works-there really is not much cost in tying
them up in copyright or otherwise. We might as well leave them in
the control of people who have a sentimental or other noncommercial
interest in them, since such people are more likely to preserve or dis-
seminate the works. The works that second-comers are most inter-
ested in reproducing, however, are precisely the same surviving
works that have commercial viability to the original creators or their
heirs. Assuming that a given work has some remaining commercial
viability, then, it is a worthwhile question to ask: Is it more "fair" to
grant whatever value there may be to the creators, their heirs, or the
company that absorbed the initial cost and took the initial risk in cre-
ating the work, or to pass the remaining commercial value to the
free-rider who waits until a work's commercial success is proven,
and then jumps in to take advantage? But, of course, economic
analysis does not factor in what is fair. Maybe that is why Congress
does not particularly limit itself to economic analysis in deciding
who should control the further dissemination of creative works.
Many or most of the works that petitioners want to distribute are
of course the "successful" works that are already available to the
public. For example, Kahlil Gibran's The Prophet, which, we are
told, Dover anxiously wants to publish, 188 is already available in
many editions, including a new hardcover copy on amazon.com for
187. Petitioners Brief, supra note 21, at 7.
188. Seeid. at3.
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$10.50, or a paperback edition for $5.98.189 Some works are indeed
out of print in this country; petitioners' intellectual property law pro-
fessors' brief highlights the out-of-print status of H. G. Wells's 1933
novel, The Shape of Things to Come.190 However, they seem not to
appreciate the ease with which copies of even out-of-print books can
be obtained in the days of the Internet. Amazon U.K. lists a paper-
back edition for £4.79.191 Under the Supreme Court's ruling in
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International,
Inc., 192 it is not a violation of anyone's copyright to order individual
copies of copyrighted works from other countries.
Indeed, under the first sale doctrine, copies of works that have
been legitimately sold in this country may be resold, and even out-of-
print works may be obtained at specialty sites such as abe.com ("Ad-
vanced Book Exchange"). 193 As of the middle of June, abe.com
listed ninety-five available copies of The Shape of Things to Come,
including some for as little as $7, and forty-five from U.S. sources
for as little as $10.194
11. Congressional hearings
Petitioners' law professors quote the Register of Copyrights
suggesting that anti-copyright forces may not have shown up at the
Copyright Office hearings of 1993, perhaps because "legislation did
not appear on the horizon."'195 The implication of the quote is that
somehow the bill slipped its way through the legislative process
without a complete review of the issues. By the time the bill was re-
ported to Congress, however, it had been given a very complete re-
view, totaling over 1000 pages of statements and appendices pre-
sented in hearings. The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings in
189. See amazon.com website, at www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-
handle-form/102-6988454-2850526 (last visited Aug. 17, 2002).
190. See Intellectual Property Professors Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra
note 144, at 2-3.
191. See amazon.co.uk website, at www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/search-
handle-form/026-8911185-2293237 (last visited Aug. 17, 2002).
192. 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
193. See abebooks.com website, at http://www.abe.com (last visited Aug. 8,
2002).
194. See id.
195. Intellectual Property Professors Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note
144, at 3.
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1995 solely on the issue of term extension. 196 The House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property held
hearings in 1995 in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C, Nashville, and
online.' 97 Many of the same law professors who participated in the
preparation of the brief also presented a statement opposing term ex-
tension; and the Senate Report contained minority views. The mi-
nority view of Senator Brown extensively recites some of the same
arguments presented in the Eldred case, so it can hardly be argued
that Congress was not fully informed of the opposition to term exten-
sion.
Petitioners and several amici suggest that Congress passes what-
ever legislation the entertainment industries ask them to pass. This
would come as news to these industries. For example, James Lard-
ner documents how the movie industries were rebuffed by Congress
in their efforts to get either a home-taping royalty or an exemption
from the first sale doctrine to cover movie rentals.1
98
III. CONCLUSION
The various extensions of copyright over the years, balanced by
careful limitations on the rights of copyright owners, are not the re-
sult of some nefarious scheme by corporations to cheat the public of
their rights. Rather, they are part of the remarkable system envi-
sioned by the framers of the Constitution, and implemented by the
Congress and the President, to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts"'199 by doing exactly what the Constitution says they are
supposed to do, "by securing, for limited Times, to Authors and In-
ventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
196. See The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995).
197. See Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation,
June 1 & July 13, 1996: Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248 and H.R. 1734 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 104th Cong. (1995); Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing
Musical Compositions; Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright per Pro-
gram Licenses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
198. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE,
AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR (1987).
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Discoveries." 200 The Supreme Court should not accept petitioners'
novel theory that would limit Congress in its ability to continue bal-
ancing the interests of copyright owners with the interests of copy-
right users.
200. Id.
